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A recent study has reported the observation in humans of an event-
related brain potential component that is sensitive to the value of
outcomes in a gambling task. This component, labeled medial frontal
negativity (MFN), was most pronounced following monetary losses
as opposed to monetary gains. In this study, we investigate the rela-
tionship between the MFN and the error-related negativity (ERN), a
component elicited by feedback indicating incorrect choice perform-
ance. We argue that the two components can be understood in terms
of a recently proposed theory that predicts the occurrence of such
scalp negativities following stimuli that indicate that ongoing events
are worse than expected. The results from two experiments using a
gambling task demonstrate that the sensitivity of the MFN/ERN to the
utilitarian and performance aspect of the feedback depends on which
aspect is most salient. The results are consistent with the view that
the two components are manifestations of the same underlying cogni-
tive and neural process.
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Introduction
Gehring and Willoughby (2002a) have reported the observa-
tion of a negative event-related potential (ERP) component that
is sensitive to feedback stimuli indicating monetary gains or
losses. The participants in their study performed a gambling
task. On each trial they were asked to choose one of two
squares, each of which contained the numeral 5 or 25, indi-
cating US cents. Each square then randomly turned either red
or green. If the chosen stimulus turned one color (e.g. green),
this meant that the participant gained the indicated number of
cents. If the chosen stimulus turned the other color (e.g. red),
this meant that the participant lost the indicated amount.
Comparison of the ERP for all gain trials with the ERP for all
loss trials revealed a negative component, peaking ∼250 ms
after the feedback, that was larger following losses than
following gains. Dipole modeling of the midline–frontal scalp
distribution of the component suggested a source in medial
frontal cortex, in or near anterior cingulate cortex. Because of
its purported medial-frontal generator, Gehring and Willoughby
labelled the ERP component the medial-frontal negativity
(MFN).
The negative brain potential reported by Gehring and
Willoughby (2002a) bears a strong resemblance to an ERP
component, the error-related negativity (ERN or Ne; Falken-
stein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993), that occurs following
response errors in speeded response tasks (Falkenstein et al.,
2000; Yeung et al., 2004), and following feedback stimuli indi-
cating incorrect performance (Miltner et al., 1997; Holroyd and
Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2002; Ruchsow et al., 2002).
Importantly, the ERN associated with negative feedback is
similar in morphology, scalp topography and latency to the
MFN reported by Gehring and Willoughby. In addition,
although one study has produced inconsistent results (Luu et
al., 2003), most evidence suggests the anterior cingulate cortex
as the likely generator of the feedback ERN (Miltner et al.,
1997; Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Ruchsow et al., 2002;
Ullsperger and von Cramon, 2003). These resemblances
between the MFN and ERN, and their seemingly similar circum-
stances of occurrence, raise the question of whether the two
components are perhaps manifestations of the same cognitive
and neural process. This possibility is consistent with the
theory of Holroyd and Coles (2002) that the ERN is generated
whenever unexpected negative events occur. The theory
predicts that one should observe an ERN following negative
feedback regardless of whether the feedback indicates an incor-
rect response or a monetary loss, since both can indicate that
events are worse than expected (Holroyd et al., 2002).
Despite the clear similarities between the ERN and MFN,
Gehring and Willoughby (2002b) suggested that they are not
identical phenomena: They point out that the scalp topog-
raphy of the MFN appears to have a more frontal distribution
than the ERN observed in previous studies, suggesting that
their underlying neural generators are different. Moreover,
they showed that while the negative ERP component observed
in their study was sensitive to the gain/loss (i.e. utilitarian)
value of the chosen outcome, it was insensitive to whether
subjects made a correct or incorrect choice (Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002a). Correctness was defined in terms of
whether the subject’s chosen outcome was better or worse
than the alternative outcome. For instance, a gain of +5 indi-
cated an incorrect choice if the alternative outcome was +25.
The finding that the MFN was insensitive to the correct/incor-
rect (i.e. performance) value of performance feedback suggests
that the MFN does not reflect the kind of error-processing
system that the feedback ERN is thought to index (Miltner et
al., 1997; Coles et al., 2001). These results seem on the surface
to be evidence that the ERN and MFN are distinct components.
However, a weakness of Gehring and Willoughby’s design
(Gehring and Willoughby, 2002a) was that the utilitarian infor-
mation was easier to extract from the feedback display than the
performance information: the most salient feature of the feed-
back, the color of the display, directly conveyed the utilitarian
value of the chosen outcome. In contrast, determining
whether the chosen outcome was the better or worse of the
two required comparing two numbers and their associated
colors, a cognitive operation that is more attention demanding
and presumably also more time consuming. Thus, although
Gehring and Willoughby’s findings are consistent with their
conclusion that the ERN and MFN are generated by separate
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systems, the findings are also consistent with the idea that
these components are produced by a single monitoring system
that responds to basic, salient information in the environment
about whether outcomes are good or bad (Holroyd and Coles,
2002): When the most salient aspect of feedback information
indicates gain/loss, as in Gehring and Willoughby’s study, the
monitoring system is sensitive to this information. When the
feedback indicates good or bad outcomes along a correct/
incorrect dimension, as in typical studies of the ERN (Miltner et
al., 1997), the monitoring system behaves like an error-
detecting system.
To test this account of Gehring and Willoughby’s findings
(Gehring and Willoughby, 2002a), we ran two experiments
using a modified version of their gambling task. In both exper-
iments, ‘+’ and ‘–’ symbols indicated a gain or loss of the
chosen numeral (see Fig. 1A). Thus, gain/loss information was
readily available in the feedback display for all participants.
However, in one experiment, the colors green and red in the
feedback display were used to emphasize the utilitarian (gain/
loss) value (Experiment 1). This condition was essentially a
replication of Gehring and Willoughby’s experiment, and thus
we expected to replicate their finding of a frontal midline nega-
tivity that is primarily sensitive to utilitarian information. The
critical prediction concerned the results of Experiment 2, in
which utilitarian information was available to the participants
but performance (correct/error) information was made salient
through the color of the feedback display. That is, participants
saw one color (e.g. green) if the chosen outcome was better
than the alternative outcome, and one color (e.g. red) if the
chosen outcome was the worse of the two outcomes. We
predicted that in this design an ERN-like negativity would be
observed. That is, we expected that the monitoring system
would be primarily sensitive to whether the chosen outcome
was the better or worse of the two, regardless of whether this
involved a win or a loss of money. In contrast, if there is a
system that is truly sensitive to utilitarian information, the
pattern of results should be similar to that found by Gehring
and Willoughby, with an MFN-like negativity sensitive to the
utilitarian value of the chosen outcome, and not to the correct-
ness of the participant’s choice.
To look ahead briefly, our results were consistent with the
hypothesis that the ERN and MFN reflect the operation of a
common system of performance monitoring: the scalp nega-
tivity observed in Experiment 1 showed sensitivity to utility
information, while the scalp negativity observed in Experiment
2 was sensitive to whether participants’ choices were correct
or incorrect. This also allowed us to directly compare for the
first time the scalp topography of the MFN and the ERN. This is
important since the MFN and feedback ERN have been meas-
ured by different research groups using different equipment
and different tasks. It seems that a more direct comparison is
needed to evaluate potential differences between the scalp
distributions. We therefore attempted such a comparison.
In sum, the present research aimed to test the hypothesis
that the ERN and MFN reflect the operation of a common moni-
toring system that provides a rapid evaluation of ongoing
events. According to this hypothesis, negative scalp potentials
will be generated whenever the monitoring system signals that
outcomes are worse than expected, e.g. following incorrect
responses or monetary losses (Holroyd and Coles, 2002).
Evidence consistent with this hypothesis would provide impor-
tant clues about the nature of the neural mechanisms contrib-
uting to human judgment and decision making.
Materials and Methods
Except where indicated, the details of the gambling task were the
same in Experiment 1 and 2.
Participants
Participants in Experiment 1 were 14 young adults (eight women),
ranging in age from 18 to 24 years (mean 22.0 years). Participants in
Experiment 2 were 12 young adults (six women), ranging in age from
18 to 26 years (mean 22.4 years). All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision. They were paid $25 as a basic salary, plus
a feedback-related bonus, as described below. The experiment
consisted of a single 2.5 h session.
Task
Each trial (see Fig. 1A) started with the presentation of a fixation
point, which remained on the screen during the whole trial. After
500 ms, two rectangles appeared on either side of the fixation point,
marking the locations of the upcoming choice alternatives. After 1 s,
the numeral ‘5’ or ‘25’ (indicating US cents) was presented in each of
the rectangles. Participants then selected one of the two choice alter-
natives by pressing a corresponding response button with their left or
right index finger. This choice was highlighted by a thickening of the
white outline of the corresponding rectangle. One second after the
choice response, the chosen and alternative outcomes were displayed
by revealing the sign (+ or –) of each numeral. To emphasize the gain/
loss (Experiment 1) or the correct/error (Experiment 2) value of the
chosen outcome, a colored rectangle, red or green, was displayed
around the two outcomes. [The nature of the feedback display
differed somewhat from that used by Gehring and Willoughby
(2002a). In their experiment, color was the only indication of
whether each outcome was associated with a gain or a loss of money
(i.e. there were no ‘+’ and ‘–’ symbols) . We used ‘+’ and ‘–’ symbols
to indicate the valence of the outcomes, so that color could be used
independently to emphasize either the gain/loss dimension or the
Figure 1. (A) Example of stimulus events in the gambling task. The duration of each
stimulus event is indicated. See text for details. (B) List of possible combinations of
chosen outcome and alternative outcome. The blue conditions indicate the four
conditions chosen here to analyze the effects of gain versus loss and correct versus
error. The underlined conditions indicate the four conditions chosen by Gehring and
Willoughby (2002a). ‘Loss’ and ‘gain’ indicate that the chosen outcome yielded a
financial penalty or reward, respectively. ‘Error’ indicates that the alternative outcome
would have yielded a larger reward or a smaller penalty, relative to the chosen
outcome. ‘Correct’ indicates that the alternative outcome would have yielded a smaller
reward or a larger penalty, relative to the chosen outcome.
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correct/error dimension of the feedback.] The feedback display
remained visible for 2.5 s, after which the next trial started.
Before the experiment, participants were informed that the value of
each chosen outcome would be added to (or subtracted from) the
total amount of bonus money awarded to them at the end of a block
of trials. They were also instructed about the meaning of the color in
the feedback display. Furthermore, they were told that their goal was
to earn as much money as possible, and that they were free to choose
any strategy to achieve that goal. Unbeknownst to the subjects, feed-
back was provided according to a prespecified pseudorandom
sequence. Because the outcomes were determined randomly and
therefore there was no strategy to learn, there was no meaningful
performance measure in this task. Instead, the task simply provided a
realistic context in which rewards and penalties, and correct and
incorrect choices were experienced. Nevertheless, at debriefing,
most participants reported that they had attempted to find a system-
atic pattern in the sequence of feedback, and that they had felt disap-
pointed when testing of a specific hypothesis regarding this sequence
led to negative outcomes.
Stimuli
Stimuli (see Fig. 1A) were presented against a black background on a
computer screen placed at a distance of ∼150 cm from the participant.
The fixation point was white and subtended 0.4°. The two rectangles
on either side of the fixation point were gray with a thin white border.
Each subtended 2.3° × 3.2°, and the visual angle between the centers
of the rectangles was ∼3.6°. The numerals were presented in a white,
28 point, bold Courier font and subtended ∼0.6° vertically. The
numerals in the feedback display were presented in font size 52. The
colored rectangle that was displayed around the outcomes subtended
5.3° × 9.6°.
Design and Procedure
The two outcomes on each trial, presented in the left and right
rectangle, were never the same [e.g. (–25, –25)]. The remaining 12
possible combinations [(–25, –5), (–25, +5), etc.] were presented
equally often across the experiment. The 12 experimental conditions
that guided the data analysis (see Fig. 1B) were defined by crossing
the four possible chosen outcomes (+25, +5, –5 and –25) with the
three possible alternative outcomes given the chosen outcome (e.g.
+25, +5 and –25 when the chosen outcome was –5). In Experiment 1,
the color of the feedback display emphasized the utilitarian (gain/loss)
value of the feedback. For half of the participants, the color green in
the feedback display emphasized a positive chosen outcome (i.e. a
gain of money), and the color red emphasized a negative chosen
outcome (i.e. a loss). For the other half of the participants, this assign-
ment was reversed. In Experiment 2, the color of the feedback display
emphasized the performance (correct/error) value of the feedback.
For half of the participants, the color green meant that they had
chosen the better of the two outcomes (i.e. a correct choice), and the
color red meant that they had chosen the worse of the two outcomes
(i.e. an incorrect choice). For the other half of the participants, this
assignment was reversed. Participants received 16 practice trials
before entering the experimental phase, which consisted of 16 blocks
of 36 trials each. At the end of each block, participants received visual
feedback indicating the amount of money earned in that block and the
accumulated total across blocks. When a block resulted in a net loss,
this total was not subtracted from the accumulated total across blocks.
There were 5 min breaks after every fourth block.
Psychophysiological Recording and Data Analysis
EEG recordings were taken from 32 Ag/AgCl electrodes placed in an
extended 10–20 system montage, referenced to linked mastoids. The
electro-oculogram (EOG) was recorded from electrodes placed above
and below the left eye, and from electrodes placed on the outer canthi
of each eye. The ground electrode was placed on the chin. All elec-
trode impedances were kept below 50 kΩ. The EEG signals were digi-
tized at 250 Hz.
Single-trial epochs were extracted offline for a period from 100 ms
before until 600 ms after the feedback stimuli. The EMCP method
(Gratton et al., 1983) was used to correct for EOG artifacts and to
discard trials with recording artifacts. A prestimulus period of 100 ms
was subtracted as a baseline. For each participant and each condition,
the EEG epochs were averaged with respect to feedback onset. Before
subsequent analyses, the resulting ERP waveforms were lowpass
filtered (<12 Hz) using a second-order digital Butterworth filter. ERN
amplitude was defined as the average value of the signal at electrode
FCz in the window 210–310 ms following the feedback, relative to a
100 ms prestimulus baseline. To facilitate our discussion of the
results, we use the label ‘ERN’ rather than ‘MFN’ to describe both the
gain/loss-related and the correct/error-related modulation of the ERP
following the feedback. ERN data were analyzed using repeated meas-
ures analyses of variance (ANOVA) with factor condition (gain and
correct, gain and error, loss and correct, loss and error; see below).
Separate ANOVAs were conducted to statistically test whether the
scalp distribution of the ERN differences of interest differed as a func-
tion of electrode location. Factors were anterior–posterior (F, FC, C,
CP, P) and lateralization (3, z, 4). The Greenhouse–Geisser correction
for violations of the ANOVA assumption of sphericity was applied
where appropriate.
Following Gehring and Willoughby (2002a), we chose four condi-
tions that allowed us to separately assess the effects of gain versus loss
and correct versus error on ERN amplitude (see Fig. 1B). A first condi-
tion consisted of trials on which participants lost 5¢ and the alterna-
tive outcome was a loss of 25¢. We call this the ‘loss & correct’
condition, because participants lost money but made a correct choice
because they would have lost even more had they chosen the alter-
native outcome. A second condition comprised all trials on which
participants lost 5¢ and the alternative outcome was a gain of 25¢. We
call this the ‘loss and error’ condition, because participants lost
money and made an incorrect choice because the alternative outcome
would have resulted in a gain of money. Following the same logic, the
other two conditions were called ‘gain and correct’ (when partici-
pants gained 5¢ and the alternative was losing 25¢) and ‘gain and
error’ (when participants gained 5¢, but would have won 25¢ had
they made the alternative choice). We evaluated the scalp topogra-
phies only for these four conditions: because gain versus loss and
correct versus error were orthogonally varied, this allowed us to
construct ERP difference waves that reflected the effect of one vari-
able (e.g. gain versus loss) while controlling for the other variable
(e.g. correct versus error). In contrast, since gains were generally
associated with a correct choice, whereas losses were generally asso-
ciated with an erroneous choice (see Fig. 1B), inclusion of all 12
conditions in the construction of the difference waves would have led
to scalp topographies in which the effects of the two variables were
confounded (cf. Gehring and Willoughby, 2002a).
Our ‘gain and error’ and ‘loss and correct’ conditions were the same
as those used by Gehring and Willoughby (2002a), but we focused on
different ‘gain and correct’ and ‘loss and error’ conditions. As can be
seen in Figure 1B, Gehring and Willoughby’s correct versus error
comparison was confounded with differences in the amount of gain or
loss. For instance, the ‘gain and correct’ condition was associated
with a gain of 25¢, whereas the ‘gain and incorrect’ condition was
associated with a gain of 5¢. Importantly, it has been shown that
differences in absolute reward magnitude affect the amplitude of the
P300 (Sutton et al., 1978; N. Yeung and A. Sanfey, submitted). This
effect is also apparent in Gehring and Willoughby’s data, and in our
data, as is evident in Figure 3. Because the feedback ERN is usually
superimposed on the P300, differences between conditions in P300
amplitude complicate the measurement of ERN amplitudes. There-
fore, although we will show the data from the four conditions chosen
by Gehring and Willoughby (Fig. 3), the major part of our analyses
involves a comparison of conditions that do not involve the confound
discussed here.
Results
Experiment 1: Emphasis on Utility
In the gambling task of Experiment 1, color was used to
emphasize the utilitarian value of the chosen outcome in the
feedback display. The basic results, shown in Figure 2 (top
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panel), replicate those of Gehring and Willoughby. The ERN
was more pronounced on loss trials than on gain trials [mean =
9.8 µV versus 11.8 µV, F(1,13) = 16.6, P < 0.001], but did not
substantially differ between correct and error trials [mean =
11.0 µV versus 10.7 µV, F(1,13) = 1.5, P = 0.38]. Although
significant, the average gain/loss effect was not very substan-
tial. Indeed, the effect was absent in many individual partici-
pants. The small gain/loss effect observed is not simply a
function of the conditions we chose for the analysis: as shown
in Figure 3, the gain/loss effect was similarly small when exam-
ined in the conditions that were analyzed by Gehring and
Willoughby. Inspection of the voltage map in Figure 2 reveals
that the small ERN effect size is reflected in the scalp topog-
raphy of the loss minus gain difference wave: The scalp distri-
bution was almost flat. This was partly due to individual
differences in the scalp distribution of the effect. We thought
that a more interpretable scalp pattern should emerge if we
focused our analysis on the participants (n = 7) who showed
the largest gain/loss effect (mean effect size = –3.5 µV versus
–0.4 µV for the seven participants with the smallest effect). As
can be seen in Figure 2 (top, rightmost panel), the resulting
scalp map showed a somewhat right-lateralized frontocentral
distribution.
Experiment 2: Emphasis on Performance
In the gambling task of Experiment 2, color was used to empha-
size the correct/error value of the chosen outcome in the feed-
back display. ERN amplitude in the four chosen conditions
showed a qualitatively different pattern than in Experiment 1
(see Fig. 2, bottom panel). There was a clear effect on ERN
amplitude of correct versus error [mean = 12.4 µV versus
9.0 µV, F(1,11) = 30.9, P < 0.001], but no effect of gain versus
loss [mean = 10.6 µV versus 10.8 µV, F(1,11) = 0.1, P = 0.72].
Unlike the gain/loss effect, the correct/error effect was present
in most of the participants. The voltage map of the error minus
correct difference wave indicated a frontocentral, slightly
right-lateralized distribution. A pair-wise comparison confirmed
that the ERN was larger over the right (electrodes ‘4’) than over
the left hemisphere (electrodes ‘3’), P = 0.003.
Figure 2. (Left panel) Feedback-locked ERPs at electrode FCz. Data from the gambling task in Experiment 1 (top) and 2 (bottom) are shown for four of the conditions. (Right panel)
Voltage maps representing the scalp topography of the ERN difference waveform at its peak latency. The subtraction underlying each difference waveform is indicated next to each
map. Blue regions indicate negative values, red regions indicate positive values. The decrease/increase in voltage represented by each isopotential line is 0.04 µV.
Figure 3. Feedback-locked ERPs at electrode FCz from the gambling task in
Experiment 1. Data are shown for the conditions that were compared by Gehring and
Willoughby (2002a). These data also illustrate the effect of differences in absolute
reward magnitude on P300 amplitude, and the resulting difficulty of measuring ERN
amplitude. 
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Between-experiment Comparisons
Statistical between-experiment comparisons of the gambling
task data confirmed that the gain/loss effect on ERN amplitude
was larger when the utilitarian (gain/loss) value of the chosen
outcome was emphasized (Experiment 1) than when the
performance (correct/error) value of the chosen outcome was
emphasized (Experiment 2), F(1,24) = 9.4, P = 0.005. As
predicted, the converse was true for the correct/error effect on
ERN amplitude, F(1,24) = 14.7, P = 0.001.
We also attempted to quantify the similarity between the
scalp topographies of the gain/loss effect in Experiment 1
(based on the participants with the largest effect) and the
correct/error effect in Experiment 2. To this end, we calcu-
lated the best-fitting regression line between the amplitudes of
the two effects across electrodes (Yeung et al., 2004). This
analysis indicated that there was a high degree of similarity
between the topographies, r = 0.67, P = 0.006. We then
performed a between-experiment ANOVA on the normalized
voltage distributions to further compare the topographies. In
line with previous analyses, this test revealed that the topogra-
phies did not reliably differ in terms of anterior-posterior orien-
tation or lateralization, both F < 1.
Discussion
The recent results of Gehring and Willoughby (2002a) have
suggested a dissociation between two electrophysiological
markers of medial frontal cortex involvement in processing
external evaluative feedback: one ERP component, the MFN,
that is sensitive to utility information in general and to losses in
particular; and another ERP component, the ERN, that is asso-
ciated with the evaluation of performance along a correct-error
dimension. The ERN and MFN have a similar morphology and
supposed neural generator in anterior cingulate cortex
(Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002a). More-
over, both scalp negativities occur very quickly following the
feedback (∼250 ms). The early latency of the two components
raises the possibility that each is sensitive primarily to basic
and salient evaluative information in the feedback stimulus. We
conducted two experiments using a modified version of
Gehring and Willoughby’s gambling task, manipulating the
relative salience of the utilitarian and performance (i.e.
correct/error) aspect of the feedback. In both experiments, the
feedback-evoked negativity was sensitive only to the most
salient aspect of the feedback display: gain/loss in Experiment
1 and correct/error in Experiment 2. The scalp topography of
these negativities did not reliably differ within the limited
spatial resolution of our measurements.
In Gehring and Willoughby’s study, the most salient informa-
tion in the feedback display was the utilitarian (i.e. gain/loss)
value of the chosen outcome, and the observed negativity was
duly sensitive to this aspect of the feedback (Gehring and
Willoughby, 2002a). In contrast, the negative component was
insensitive to performance (i.e. correct/incorrect) information.
The results of our study suggest that Gehring and Willoughby’s
findings may reflect the nature of the feedback stimuli used in
their experiment. We found that when the salient aspect of the
feedback signaled the performance value of the chosen
outcome, the observed negativity was sensitive to this aspect
of the feedback. Of course, our results cannot definitively rule
out the possibility that the MFN and ERN reflect the activity of
two different systems: one system involved in the rapid compu-
tation of utility, and one system involved in the rapid detection
of errors. The activity of these systems may happen to be
expressed in scalp negativities that are similar in timing,
appearance, scalp topography, and purported generator.
Indeed, in general it is difficult to exclude the possibility that
two seemingly identical phenomena may actually reflect the
operation of related, but dissociable cognitive and neural
systems. However, if the two systems for processing gain/loss
and correct/error information are operating in parallel, one
would predict that we should see effects of both gain/loss and
correct/error in both experiments, and these effects should
sum. For example, we should see an effect of gain/loss in the
experiment in which correct/error information is emphasized
(Experiment 2), since the gain/loss information is clearly and
explicitly specified in the feedback (as ‘+’ and ‘–’ symbols).
However, in neither of the experiments do we observe such a
graded effect, nor do Gehring and Willoughby in their experi-
ment.
Therefore, the data are perhaps more naturally explained by
the view that the MFN and feedback ERN reflect the activity of
a single monitoring system that rapidly evaluates outcomes
along a good-bad dimension on the basis of the most salient
evaluative information in the environment. This view is
consistent with a recently proposed theory (Holroyd and
Coles, 2002), according to which the ERN is elicited when the
monitoring system first detects that ongoing events (e.g. the
outcomes of our actions) are worse than expected. In the
context of this theory, utilitarian and performance aspects of
feedback are functionally equivalent: both evaluate outcomes
along a good-bad dimension, and hence both can elicit an ERN
(Holroyd et al., 2002).
We believe that our account is more parsimonious than the
two-systems account. One way in which our account might be
disconfirmed is by establishing that the neural source of the
feedback ERN and MFN are different; our prediction is that
they have the same neural generator. Our finding that the scalp
topographies of the two components did not reliably differ is
suggestive rather than conclusive in this regard. The gain/loss
effect was relatively small and was not consistently observed in
individual participants. Moreover, the scalp topographies
showed variability across participants, particularly so for the
participants showing a gain/loss effect. As a consequence of
these factors, the scalp distribution of the average gain/loss
effect was essentially flat — there was not much effect to
distribute. Confining the scalp topography to a subgroup with
the strongest gain/loss effects yielded a clearer pattern, but this
result is necessarily less powerful. Thus, the observed small
difference between the scalp topographies in Figure 2 may
simply be due to factors such as sampling error and low signal-
to-noise ratio. However, the observed difference may also
reflect a real difference in scalp topography, consistent with a
two-systems account. Discrimination between these possibili-
ties may require different methods, such as high-density EEG
recordings or functional magnetic resonance imaging. Yet,
although the scalp topography results do not allow us to draw
any strong conclusions, it is interesting that both the gain/loss
effect and the correct/error effect showed a somewhat right-
lateralized frontocentral scalp distribution. The lateralization of
the ERN is rather unusual, and may suggest the contribution to
the scalp distribution of other reward-related neural activity
that is specific to the gambling task used here.
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The difference in sensitivity of the ERN between the two
experiments was brought about by only a small change in the
feedback display: the meaning of the background color.
Indeed, the background color provided information that was
completely redundant; the utilitarian value and performance
value of the chosen outcome could be derived from the
numbers and their valence, as indicated by the ‘+’ and ‘–’
symbols. Yet, the effect of manipulating color was large: In
both experiments, almost all of the variance in ERN amplitude
could be explained in terms of the variable emphasized by the
color of the feedback display. Thus, the results are consistent
with our hypothesis that the system underlying the ERN uses
the most salient information available in the feedback display.
This seems an essential property of a system that has been
argued to play an important role in rapid, online adjustments of
behavior (Gehring et al., 1993). This is not to say that partici-
pants were not interested in how much they won or lost. We
know that participants cared about (or at least paid attention
to) the absolute magnitude of the chosen outcome (±25 versus
±5), because in both experiments P300 amplitude was highly
sensitive to this variable (Sutton et al., 1978; N. Yeung and
A. Sanfey, submitted). An important question for future
research is the way in which rapidly available evaluative infor-
mation (as reflected in the ERN) is integrated with more
complex information, such as absolute magnitude of the
outcome (as reflected in the P300).
We have recently begun to explore the effects of context on
the amplitude of the feedback ERN. By context we mean the
set of experimental factors that affect how a particular feed-
back stimulus is evaluated. The function that determines how a
subjective value (i.e. along a good–bad dimension) is attributed
to actual feedback outcomes is not straightforward. For
instance, it is well known that people’s subjective value does
not increase linearly as a function of amount of monetary gain
(Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947). In our view, context
affects the function relating actual outcomes to subjective
value, and therefore, indirectly, ERN amplitude. In a recent
paper (Holroyd et al., 2004), we have shown that ERN ampli-
tude to a specific outcome is substantially modulated by the
range of other possible outcomes in the task (i.e. shows
context dependence). For instance, feedback indicating neither
gain nor loss elicited a larger ERN in a condition in which this
outcome constituted the worst possible outcome, than in a
condition in which it was the best possible outcome. The
present study suggests another form of context dependence of
the feedback ERN. The study suggests that the emphasis placed
on utilitarian and performance aspects of the feedback can
influence the relative weighing of these two factors in
computing the subjective value associated with the feedback.
Finally, we note that our results do not speak to the question
of whether the ERN is a direct manifestation of the cognitive
system that we have outlined above, or instead is a manifesta-
tion of a neural circuit involved in assessing the emotional
impact of outcomes (Luu et al., 2000; Gehring and Willoughby,
2002a). The emotion hypothesis leaves open the question how
negative outcomes are detected in the brain; this function may
be carried out by a system for reinforcement learning, which in
turn may provide the input for a system involved in emotional
and motivational functioning. Indeed, cognitive aspects of
performance monitoring may be so intricately linked to
emotional consequences that it may be impossible to tease
apart cognitive and emotional correlates of performance moni-
toring. If that is the case, the debate whether the ERN reflects
cognitive or emotional processing becomes moot. 
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